What happens if a member of nato is attacked

The search for a NATO consensus delayed a military response past the point when it could have been effective in mitigating the consequences of the violent Serb crackdown in Kosovo and laying a foundation for a plausible and sustainable political resolution to the conflict without a large international military presence to enforce it.

At a time when allied views on the nature of likely threats and the scope and extent of possible responses increasingly diverge, insisting on unanimity for joint action is as likely to result in an allied stalemate as in a decision to intervene. While always striving to achieve an Alliance consensus, the allies should agree that joint military action by some NATO allies may in certain circumstances be both possible and desirable even without a formal decision by the North Atlantic Council.

But they must be weighed against the requirements for a flexible and adaptable instrument for joint military action at a time when allied interests vary more than ever. In the end, an Alliance that provides the basis for rapid and effective responses to crises in and outside allied territory, even if action is taken by a subset of allies, is preferable to one that conditions action on potentially unattainable unanimous support. In principle, there is nothing in the Washington treaty to prevent NATO from taking military action wherever its members agree—in or out of Europe.

In practice, however, there is no agreement on how far this commitment to consultation and the coordination of joint efforts extends geographically. On one side of the debate stands the United States, which, as a global power with global interests, argues that NATO should be the instrument of choice to deal with threats to the common interests of its members, wherever these threats arise.

At the same time, U. Our nations share global interests that require us to work together to the same degree of solidarity that we have long maintained on this continent. Europe today is at relative peace. For the first time in a century, European stability is not threatened by a major power—be it a revisionist Germany or an expansionist Russia.

At the same time, instability and threats to real, if not vital, interests do exist outside of Europe. These include WMD proliferation, terrorism, disruption of energy supplies, and challenges to the balance of power in critical regions like southwest and northeast Asia.

Second, if threats outside Europe pose the most immediate challenge to the shared interests of the NATO countries, the Alliance combines countries that are the most capable of dealing with these types of threats. For most European allies—including even those, like Britain and France, whose interests extend well beyond Europe—the Atlantic Alliance remains a quintessential European security organization, whose fundamental purpose is to provide security in and for Europe.

The debate among them is not whether the Alliance should have a role beyond Europe, but rather how far beyond allied territory its role should extend. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where U. It is also true regarding a threat that many regard as the preeminent post-cold war challenge to NATO—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas Secretary Albright has argued that WMD proliferation constitutes as much of a unifying threat to the Alliance as the Soviet threat of yesteryear, most European allies neither perceive it as an immediate threat to Europe nor regard NATO as the primary instrument for effectively dealing with the WMD threat.

International treaties and organizations, including the United Nations, as well as more ad-hoc supplier regimes are generally regarded as the preferred instruments for addressing proliferation. In contrast to the U. The same might be said of other challenges to common interests outside Europe.

This is consistent with the original intent of the Alliance, which, as expressed in Article 10 of the Washington treaty, limited consideration of future membership to European states. Moreover, under the UN Charter, the Atlantic Alliance operates as a regional rather than a global organization.

At the same time, they should do nothing that would deny those allies that so desire the ability to operate beyond this region if and when they believe it to be necessary. Indeed, one of the unique strengths of the Alliance is that it provides a solid foundation for joint military action by some or all allies in defense of their territory, values, and interests wherever such action they deem appropriate.

Of the many issues relating to the threat and use of force by NATO that have divided the allies, none have been as contentious as the so-called mandate question, i. At the outset of this debate, most allies believed that NATO should not act in this type of situation without an explicit mandate or authorization from the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The French perspective is based on the notion that the use force in international affairs, by a single state or group of states like NATO, is ultimately governed by the United Nations Charter. The UN Security Council is empowered by the Charter to determine the existence of any threat to or breach of peace Article At the same time, the Charter recognizes that states have the right to defend themselves individually and collectively Article 51 and that regional arrangements or agencies can maintain peace and security within their region, provided they do so in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Article The former situation falls squarely within the collective defense commitment of the Washington treaty; the latter, as the case of Bosnia demonstrated, follows logically from the right of collective self-defense.

That is the import of both Article 2 which prohibits the use force against the territory or political independence of another state and the proviso of Article 52 which limits action by regional arrangements such as NATO to those that are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. It follows from this reasoning that NATO can only use force in non-Article 5 contingencies either if it is invited to do so by the state involved or if it is explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council.

That, after all, remains a major French objective. And in occupying one of five permanent member seats on the UN Security Council, Paris naturally has an interest in enhancing the role and authority of that body.

But there are more substantial reasons for U. Indeed, since both countries want to avoid setting the precedent that NATO or any other organization or groupings of states can intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and if such intervention were to be conditioned on UN approval, either or both of the states is bound to use its veto in the Security Council to prevent forceful NATO action. As a result, the insistence on a UN mandate implies that the type of behavior Europe has witnessed in the Balkans during the last decade, including the widespread abuse of human rights and denial of fundamental freedoms, would go effectively unpunished or undeterred.

Given this practical reality, the United States favors leaving the decision on whether or not to use force up to the organization that would be responsible for undertaking such action—in this case to NATO.

The Clinton Administration has argued that if nineteen democracies deem the threat or use of force necessary to right a specific wrong, then that fact in and of itself provides sufficient justification and legitimacy for the contemplated action.

No country would accept constraints on its freedom to act on behalf of its own interests in the manner and at a time it judges best. It argues that the same should be true for any organization of democratic states that acts on the basis of consensus. It was not until the crisis in Kosovo erupted in that the NATO allies were confronted with the practical implications of what had been up to that point a largely theoretical argument.

By early fall, the Alliance was forced to consider whether to threaten significant air strikes against Serbia, a sovereign country in the middle of Europe engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians in the province of Kosovo. France and others argued that NATO, as a defensive alliance, could not act in situations other than self-defense unless the action was explicitly authorized by the United Nations.

Always hesitant about using military force, Bonn was particularly cautious in staking out a new position in the run-up to the October Kosovo decision given that elections in late September had brought to power a new, center-left government.

Aside from these theoretical differences, the Alliance also faced a practical complication. After an agonizing series of diplomatic discussions and last-minute reports of a possible diplomatic breakthrough, the North Atlantic Council voted on October 13, , to activate NATO forces and authorize its supreme commander to commence air strikes following a ninety-six hour delay.

The Serbs had also clearly violated the Geneva Convention on warfare. What proved decisive for many allies, however, was not that NATO under these circumstances could mandate itself to act, but rather the belief that the humanitarian crisis inside Kosovo could not be prevented without forceful action. There may be moments in which it is necessary to act for humanitarian reasons, when a UN Security Council resolution will not be necessary or will not be even appropriate because the UN charter does not contemplate humanitarian acts.

Despite having taken this decision, the NATO allies remain divided over whether Kosovo set a precedent for the future. Where does this leave the Alliance? In principle, NATO may embark on non-Article 5 missions without the consent of the government s involved only if its actions enjoy the authorization of the UN Security Council.

In practice, however, limiting NATO to those actions that have been approved by the Security Council could subject the Alliance to an effective veto by China or Russia. At the heart of the alliance, however, lies the collective defense commitment to assist each other in the event of an armed attack. For the past twenty years, as NATO has mostly pursued an open door policy toward Central and Eastern Europe, the alliance has grown by integrating former members of the Warsaw Pact, nonmembers who were previously friendly with the Soviet Union, and three former Soviet republics the three Baltic states.

The principles underlying enlargement are that new member states must choose freely to join NATO, that they fulfill a number of political and military criteria such as having settled any ethnic or external territorial disputes, as well as being able to contribute militarily and financially to collective defense , and that their accession strengthens the alliance. NATO insists that it does not seek conflict with Russia.

NATO members have sometimes disagreed about which elements of this approach to prioritize; at times, fractures between different national positions have become very visible. But allies also recognized the need to increase the resilience of all members and to seek dialogue with Russia. For NATO, the Russian challenge presents multiple uncertainties, which exacerbate the potential for disagreement.

They fear that Moscow could even use military force against the alliance, particularly the Baltic states. In addition, the states that see Russia as revanchist are mindful of Russian domestic politics and how these forces interact with the tensions with NATO.

According to a popular—and probably correct—theory, Putin, confronted with an ailing Russian economy, to some extent may need the friction with NATO, and particularly with Washington, to hold on to power.

This general disagreement about current and projected Russian intentions and interests is important because it exacerbates the potential for escalation for two quite different reasons. In this case, an incorrect threat assessment by NATO could invite Moscow to deliberately escalate the already simmering general tensions with NATO and go a significant step further, perhaps by invading one of the Baltic states.

Second, and conversely, if NATO overestimates the threat from Russia, its well-intentioned defensive measures may reinforce legitimate, as well as imagined, Russian security concerns.

In this case, misreading the threat could lead NATO to create additional pressure on Moscow to up the ante, which could lead to both arms races and increased tensions—making escalation more likely. These two potential risks—of NATO doing too little and doing too much—create very specific escalation risks in the Baltic region, in both the conventional and nuclear realms.

Although NATO as a whole has much greater conventional military capabilities than Russia, Moscow enjoys a significant margin of conventional superiority in the wider Baltic region see map. Russia has been heavily funding and modernizing its aging armed forces over the last decade, making them a credible force again.

In addition, Moscow continues to expand its arsenal of long-range cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions. To be fair, Russian modernization efforts continue to experience serious setbacks, as a result of widespread corruption and mismanagement, for instance. NATO also agreed to increase the intensity and scope of its exercises in the region to deter Russian aggression and assure its eastern members.

Separately, the United States has sent additional forces and military equipment under a U. These framework nations contribute the majority of forces to each battalion. One NFIU is located in each country in the region; these units are designed to serve as reinforcement hubs and to link NATO forces to their national hosts.

In any case, even in the event of a conflict, SACEUR can only move forces in a very limited fashion—and not beyond borders without a North Atlantic Council executive directive.

This deployment also includes a combat aviation brigade of about 2, personnel , headquartered in Germany; a combat sustainment support battalion of about personnel , based in Poland with a logistics hub in Romania; and a support team in Lithuania. These steps have increased the overall number of U. The logic behind this strategy is that involving NATO forces from a variety of nations in a conflict against Russia—and hence giving them a direct stake in the outcome—would help minimize pressure within the alliance to simply cede to Russia any territory it may take, thus strengthening deterrence and preventing deliberate Russian escalation.

However, the benefits of this multinational approach might be significantly overstated. As some Western analysts have pointed out, a limited, targeted Russian attack could implicate only a small subset of the nations that contribute to the EFP. Moreover, Russia has repeatedly shown that it can muster a force of up to , personnel in its Western Military District on relatively short notice. The main purpose of the EFP personnel would be to ensure that as many NATO allies as possible would be involved in combat, or to put it more bluntly, would die.

In the event of a crisis or combat, the EFP could, according to current plans, receive two waves of reinforcements. At most, the complete eNRF consists of 40, personnel including the Spearhead.

Assembling, moving, and deploying those forces would take time. NATO estimates that it would take less than seven days to deploy the Spearhead. Moreover, given the current U. In any case, all military crisis planning ultimately depends on NATO allies politically agreeing to use force to counter a potential Russian attack.

While the decision to enter war with Russia would certainly not be an easy one, it would require a unanimous vote by the twenty-nine members of the NAC. In the event that Russia threatened a conventional attack, NATO decisionmakers would be under potentially enormous pressure to ready the Spearhead and perhaps also the eNRF as early as possible to prevent deliberate escalation.

But Moscow could misinterpret these actions as an imminent threat, leading Russia to rapidly escalate in response. Russia enjoys considerable strategic depth in its vast Western Military District and has a well-integrated railroad system to reinforce troops quickly in the event of a conflict.

By contrast, NATO allies would have to fly or ship in reinforcements of personnel and military equipment—a much slower process. Particularly the latter represents a serious problem for NATO. These capabilities include conventional and dual-capable guided missiles, anti-ship weapons, air defense systems, and several layers of modern radar.

Taken together, the current EFP configuration has loopholes that might provide Russia with the opportunity for a military fait accompli, effectively taking a small part of Latvia. This increases the risk of deliberate escalation. If Russia were to only threaten a conventional attack, the risk of inadvertent escalation might increase once NATO decides to deploy additional forces to the Baltics.

Last but not least, in any crisis or open conflict with Russia, NATO would face serious but not insurmountable obstacles reinforcing its troops. Officials from the region have echoed some of these concerns.

Baltic officials, in particular, argue in private conversations for additional deployments—particularly of U. These views are at odds with those of other NATO allies who have warned the alliance of unnecessarily increasing tensions with Russia by going beyond current deployments.

Germany and France, in particular, seem to believe that the EFP is sufficient and that further military deployments are not an urgent matter. After all, on the other hand, NATO states currently have 3.

Proponents of a more cautious approach worry that NATO and Russia are entering a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual insecurity, with each side mis interpreting the actions of the other as potentially offensive in nature.

They argue that the instability of an uncontrolled arms race, driven by a desire for more security, further increases general tensions with Russia and could ultimately lead to escalation. Germany sees arms control measures for the wider Baltic region—such as mutual force limitations in the region and more transparency regarding large as well as snap Russian exercises—as useful tools for enhancing crisis stability and avoiding a renewed arms race.

For the time being, NATO seems focused on maintaining the delicate balance of assuring its easternmost allies, considering calls for caution, and signaling resolve as well as non-offensive intentions to Russia.

At the same time, as a result of this concession, NATO has accepted the military and political hardship that would come with retaking the Baltics in the event of a potential Russian attack. This consensus is, however, not necessarily set in stone. The Brussels Treaty signatories preferred that membership in the alliance be restricted to the members of that treaty plus the United States. Together, these countries held territory that formed a bridge between the opposite shores of the Atlantic Ocean, which would facilitate military action if it became necessary.

The result of these extensive negotiations was the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in In this agreement, the United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom agreed to consider attack against one an attack against all, along with consultations about threats and defense matters.

This collective defense arrangement only formally applied to attacks against the signatories that occurred in Europe or North America; it did not include conflicts in colonial territories. After the treaty was signed, a number of the signatories made requests to the United States for military aid. Soon after the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the outbreak of the Korean War led the members to move quickly to integrate and coordinate their defense forces through a centralized headquarters.

The North Korean attack on South Korea was widely viewed at the time to be an example of communist aggression directed by Moscow, so the United States bolstered its troop commitments to Europe to provide assurances against Soviet aggression on the European continent. West German entry led the Soviet Union to retaliate with its own regional alliance, which took the form of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and included the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe as members.

The threat of this form of response was meant to serve as a deterrent against Soviet aggression on the continent. Although formed in response to the exigencies of the developing Cold War, NATO has lasted beyond the end of that conflict, with membership even expanding to include some former Soviet states.

It remains the largest peacetime military alliance in the world. Menu Menu. Milestones: —